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When we attempt to apply the principles of ethical expertise — which originated, after all, 
in the field of biomedicine — to the sphere of culture, we face the fundamental problem of 
any expertise: the lack of a methodology that will enable at least the partial elimination of the 
influence of “subjective factors”, ranging from experts’ ideological and religious preferences 
to their personal moral qualities and emotional responses. This paper aims to develop such 
a methodology. To resolve this problem, the author proposes to revisit the forgotten art of 
casuistry, which was flourishing at the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries. At 
that time, the golden rule of casuistry was to regard various ethical principles and norms as 
more or less plausible opinions (opinion probabilis). One could choose one of these opinions 
only after discussion and evaluation of each opinion and its outcomes in each specific case. 
Today, the use of casuistry in ethical expertise means that experts can proceed not from 
their own convictions and principles, but from an assessment of a specific situation, and a 
comparison between possible consequences resulting from the application of certain moral 
requirements to that situation. Only those conclusions which satisfy all the experts can be 
termed “justified”. However, such a consensus will be impossible if the experts base their 
conclusions not on an analysis of the consequences of a specific decision, but on their own 
favoured religious or ideological doctrines. Theoretically speaking, the author believes that 
casuistry as a method of ethical expertise implies not only an assessment of a particular case 
from the point of view of the general principles of morality but also the evaluation of these 
principles in light of their applicability to particular cases.
Keywords: ethics, expertise, culture, casuistry, opinions.
* This article was prepared for the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR), project Nr. 18-011-
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1. Introduction
Ethical expertise originated in the field of biomedicine, and now is actively employed 
in other spheres of public life, including business, education, mass-media, etc. In any 
application, its goal is to assess how an event or action can affect the physical and psycho-
logical state of a person, their values, dignity, freedom, etc. However, the more widespread 
the use of ethical expertise becomes, the more obvious are the problems and contradic-
tions associated with it, and first and foremost, we are handicapped by the absence of any 
sound methodology. For this reason, the results of ethical expertise depend completely 
upon society’s “moral stereotypes”, which are usually contradictory, bigoted, and abstract 
(that is, not applicable to specific cases), as well as upon experts’ “personal qualities” and 
ideological predispositions.
But it is probably in the sphere of culture that ethical expertise has been most dra-
matically compromised. On the one hand, it is obvious that today some kind of ethical 
evaluation of cultural phenomena is necessary: modern society constantly faces manifes-
tations of extremism, xenophobia, religious fanaticism, etc., which are often disseminated 
through various cultural products (fiction, historical narratives, biased textbooks, pro-
vocative films and theatrical productions) as well as the resurgence of ethically unaccept-
able traditions. But on the other hand, so-called “pseudo-ethical expertise” is extremely 
common here: under the guise of ethical expertise, culture is subjected to ideological 
pressure, the authorities demonstrate religious or ethnic intolerance and exercise politi-
cal decisions. We can even name certain cases when so-called “ethical expertise” became 
the means to justify the seizure of cultural property (theaters, libraries, museums) or to 
eliminate rivals. Of course, the majority of these incidents should be subject to legal as-
sessment, but they also reveal the intrinsic problem of any ethical expertise: the lack of a 
methodology enabling the elimination of the so-called “subjective factor”.
Undoubtedly, any methodology seeks to eliminate the “subjective factor” and bring a 
researcher as close to an “objective truth” as possible. But can we achieve this in the sphere 
of morality, where judgments (from the position of logic and semantics) do not corre-
spond to any “objective reality” at all, and consequently cannot be either true or false? In 
this paper, we do not need to list all the arguments against ethical objectivism formulated 
throughout the history of philosophy, from the Sophists to the postmodernists. Suffice it 
to emphasize that the desire to find some solid foundation for our moral decisions and to 
exclude alternative forms of behavior is not only unachievable but also conflicts with the 
very essence of morality. As Karl Popper rightly noted, “if it could be achieved, it would 
destroy all personal responsibility and consequently all ethics” [1, p. 207, n. 18]. Morality 
always implies decision or choice, and when we speak about decision or choice, there will 
not and can not be any one truth. It is, for example, impossible to decide or to choose that 
two times two equals four.
However, Aristotle already understood that, in addition to the theoretical, there is a 
practical reason, and the conclusions of practical reason are not arbitrary, though they do 
not represent the results of the cognition of “objective reality”. He emphasized that our ethi-
cal reasoning cannot, of course, be as accurate as our reasoning about objective reality. But 
“Now fine and just actions, which political science investigates, admit of much variety and 
fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be thought to exist only by convention, and not by 
nature” [2, 1094b14–17]. In the search for an adequate methodology for ethical expertise, 
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it is, in my opinion, worthwhile to remember two sciences which date back to Aristotelian-
ism and are forgotten in the modern era. Of course, they are far from being as precise as the 
natural sciences, logic, and mathematics, but they still enable us to eliminate voluntarism in 
value judgments. These two sciences are ethical (legal) hermeneutics and casuistry.
2. Hermeneutics 
Since the age of Romanticism, hermeneutics has been primarily viewed as the art of 
understanding. Here we can speak about an understanding of the original meaning of a 
text, an author’s idea, which belongs to another space or time, and so on. Whatever the 
case, the task is to comprehend something alien to our own consciousness, to include 
some unfamiliar material in our own system of ideas and concepts. However, in times pre-
ceding the era of Romanticism, hermeneutics had another goal. For example, in the Mid-
dle Ages hermeneutics aimed not so much to understand a text, as to use it. Whether it was 
about the Holy Scripture or a law book, a hermeneut strove not to understand an author’s 
idea or to grasp the “spirit of the past”, but rather to link this text with a current situation 
to which it could be applied. In the second half of the 19th century, Hans-Georg Gadamer 
came to the controversial conclusion that understanding itself is impossible without an ap-
plication. “In the course of our reflections,” — the philosopher wrote, — “we have come to 
see that understanding always involves something like applying the text to be understood 
to the interpreter’s present situation” [3, p. 306–307]. Of course, these conclusions by an 
authoritative philosopher contributed to a certain revival of interest in the medieval art of 
hermeneutics. However, even Gadamer saw the application of hermeneutics as a tool for 
understanding and not as something significant by itself. In my opinion, the “hermeneu-
tics of application” is an independent activity as useful today as it was in the Middle Ages, 
but requiring some methodological modernization.
It was Judaism that in the first centuries AD primarily postulated the methodologi-
cal problems connected with the application of the biblical commandments to the endless 
variety of specific cases. In early Christianity, these problems lost their significance as the 
New Testament gave “spirit” priority over “letter”, i.e. preached that faith and love allow a 
person to act in accordance with the Law without any further reasoning. Therefore, the 
foundations of all subsequent ethical and legal hermeneutics were established by those Jew-
ish preachers whose work led to the creation of the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmud.
The methodology of ethical and theological hermeneutics (or Middot) was shaped 
by the seven rules of Hillel (1st century AD). These rules can be conveniently translated 
as follows: 1) analogy; 2) conclusion from simple to complex; 3) conclusion based on the 
identity of the expressions; 4) conclusion from two contradicting texts (when we should 
find the third text removing the contradiction); 5) conclusion made by finding the main 
(common) premise; 6) reasoning from general to particular; 7) conclusion from the con-
text. With the help of these rules, laws, and stories of the Torah could be applied to actual 
cases and circumstances.
Researchers have repeatedly noted that the rules of Hillel do not go beyond Aristote-
lian syllogistics. In fact, as an expert on the Talmud Yehuda Leib Katsnelson emphasized 
at the beginning of the last century, the difference between Hillel’s and Aristotelian syl-
logistics lies in the fact that the former was invulnerable to John Stuart Mill’s attacks. It is 
well known that Mill reproached Aristotelian syllogism for an internal contradiction. For 
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example, the reasoning: “All people are mortal / Kai is a person / Therefore, Kai is mor-
tal”, — contains an obvious contradiction. If, while building a syllogism, I set a question 
about Kai’s mortality, I already have some doubts and, therefore, have no right to say that 
all people are mortal. According to Katzenelson, Hillel does not have such a contradiction, 
due to the fact that Aristotle speaks about the phenomena of life (which by their very na-
ture are unfinished, i.e., derived from the so-called “incomplete induction”), while Hillel 
discusses the law established by God, and thus the major premise of his syllogisms is a 
priori absolute [4]. As we will see, this distinction between biblical hermeneutics and Ar-
istotelian syllogistics will become a turning point in the formation of European casuistry 
of the 16th and 17th centuries.
As for the Middot, its further development resulted in the increase of the number of 
methods. Thus, in the 2nd century AD, Rabbi Ishmael ben Elisha turned the seven rules of 
Hillel into thirteen; Rabbi Eliezer ben Rabbi Yossi Haglili established thirty two rules; fi-
nally, in the 19th century, Malbim (Meir Leibush ben Yehiel Michel Wisser) compiled a list 
of six hundred and thirteen rules for commenting on a text. The only invariable conviction 
was that three principles are correct: 1) the principle of the absolute truth of initial premises 
(the Law); 2) the principle of the impossibility of contradictions (God does not contradict 
Himself); and 3) the “default” principle allowing for the usage of Aristotelian logic of genus-
species relations. In my opinion, this very increase in the number of rules indicates the 
limitations of these three principles. The acknowledgment of these limitations gave rise to 
the European casuistry of the late Renaissance and Baroque era, which changed the very 
“mechanics” of interactions between a “general rule” and a “specific case”.
3. Casuistry
Of course, casuistry as a science striving to resolve specific moral problems (or, as 
they are usually described in Catholic theology, special cases of conscience — casus con-
scientiae) arose in Europe long before the Renaissance. In the first centuries of the history 
of Christianity, clerics understood that faith and love alone could not form a solid founda-
tion for morality; since the 4th century, the treatise “De oficiis ministrorum” by Ambrose, 
Archbishop of Milan, has served as a model for Christian morality — in this work, virtues, 
whose sum formed a summum bonum of Christian ethics, were described according to 
the Ciceronian scheme; since the 8th century, so-called “penitentials” (libri poenitentiales) 
containing lists of sins and their respective penalties, have been circulated; and by the 
12th century, when the clergy had to acknowledge that penitentials were not enough to 
deal with the endless variety of concrete cases and situations, casuistry had been born. 
However, up to the 16th century, casuistry was shaped by the deduction of various pri-
vate rules from the general principles of morality, and so resembled hermeneutics in the 
aforementioned sense of this word. Moreover, unlike the Judaic discipline, Christian ethi-
cal hermeneutics developed not so much by the multiplication of the rules of interpreta-
tion, as by an increase in the number of precedents. This led to the creation of ever more 
cumbersome moral codes containing innumerable clauses, additions, assumptions, and 
clarifications. By the 16th century, the need for a new method to resolve moral problems 
had become obvious.
The development of such a method began after the Council of Trent (1545–1563), 
which aimed to strengthen the theological base of the Roman Catholic Church as it faced 
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the imminent assault of Protestantism. And here the Society of Jesus played the lead-
ing role: as a result of the Jesuits’ efforts, the methodology of so-called probabilism was 
worked out [5]. 
Probabilism was based on the conviction that the majority of moral principles can 
be subjected to rational discussion. The Jesuits rightly observed that if a person in his or 
her actions had to rely only on unquestioned and universal principles, he or she wouldn’t 
do anything at all. In the sphere of morality, we are dealing not with general and indis-
pensable truths, but with more or less plausible opinions (opinion probabilis), i.e. with 
opinions which are either shared by the majority of people or substantiated by some sort 
of authority. In each specific situation, a person has to choose between these opinions. 
Theoretically, the ethics of probabilism proceeded from the Aristotelian logic of believ-
able opinions. According to Aristotle, plausible opinions are those, which “are accepted 
by everyone or by the majority or by the philosophers — i.e. by all, or by the majority, 
not by the most notable and illustrious of them” [6, I. 1.100 b 20]. To decide which of the 
plausible opinions should be chosen is possible only after the discussion and estimation of 
each opinion according to its consequences.
Of course, the Jesuits did not deny the existence of certain common a priori notions 
of good and evil: for example, the ten commandments of the Old Testament or the lessons 
of the Sermon on the Mount. These a priori notions form the contents of natural law, and 
a person should not have any doubts about them. But natural law is abstract and specula-
tive (speculatio). To be implemented in real life (in praxi), natural law should be expressed 
as a positive law, some commonly accepted system of norms. Unlike natural law, this posi-
tive law can be subject to doubt and debate.
According to their casuistic classification, opinions can be, firstly, more reliable (proba-
bilior) or less reliable (minus probabilis); secondly, more solid (tutior) or less solid (minus 
tuta). In accordance with this classification, casuistry has been divided into four branch-
es: tutiorism, probabiliorism, equiprobabilism, and probabilism. Tutiorism assumed that we 
should follow only the most solid opinions, even if the less solid opinions are more plausible. 
According to probabiliorism, we may also follow non-solid opinions if they are more reliable 
than the opposite ones. According to equiprobabilism, we can follow a less solid opinion 
even if it and a more solid opinion are equally probable. Finally, according to probabilism, 
in certain situations, we can proceed from the least reliable and solid opinions. A paragon 
of probabilism, Herman Bousenbaum, wrote: “We would not commit any sin, following less 
probable… and solid opinion and rejecting the most probable and solid one, if we, firstly, do 
not endanger and harm our neighbours, and, secondly, if an accepted opinion is still prob-
able” [7, Lib. I, Tr. I. C. II. Dub. II. Resp.]. In other words, in probabilism the opinion about 
the morality of an action is acceptable if it is to any degree probable and solid.
Many people reproached the Jesuits since in such a manner they could justify abso-
lutely everything. It was likely to be so: the Jesuits often used probabilism to justify ac-
tions motivated not so much by moral or religious considerations as political ones. But 
probabilism is not the only way to prescribe ethical significance to amoral actions: we can 
reproach moral absolutism for allowing the same thing. In fact, probabilism is, firstly, the 
art of assessing the situation correctly, and secondly, the belief that a person is individu-
ally responsible for any choice. To clarify this, here is an old Jesuit example: Can a doctor 
operate on a patient if the probability of opinion that this operation will help is small, and 
the probability of opinion that the patient will die is great? The answer is: If the patient will 
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certainly die without this operation, the doctor has moral grounds to take the risk of as-
suming full responsibility for the consequences of his actions [8, Examen III. Caput VI. 25].
This approach seems much more reasonable than the one that calls for the imple-
mentation of a “general duty” regardless of any circumstances. In my opinion, it can lay 
the foundations for the ethical expertise of any kind of activity: from medicine to culture.
4. Between Absolutism and Relativism
On the brink of the Enlightenment, probabilism was opposed by the ethical doctrines 
of Protestantism and Jansenism (which to a large degree resembled each other), and it 
was the Jansenists who particularly bitterly criticized the Jesuits’ ethics. This criticism was 
expounded in the collective Jansenist treatises, written in the famous circle at the monas-
tery of Port-Royal-des-Champs: “Théologie morale des Jésuites” (1644), “Factum pour les 
curés de Paris” (1658), and Blaise Pascal’s “Lettres à un provincial” (1656). However, these 
writings analyzed and scoffed at some specific and substantial points of the Jesuit eth-
ics. The logical foundations of anti-probabilism were summarized in the famous book by 
Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, “Logic; or, The Art of Thinking”, which is commonly 
known as the “Port-Royal Logic”.
It should be noted that the authors of the “Port-Royal Logic” regarded ethics as the 
main sphere for the application of logic [9]. The Aristotelian logic of plausible opinions 
(which lays the foundations for probabilism) became their primary target. This logic, Ar-
nauld and Nicole argued, leads either to authoritarianism, that is, to the habit of relying 
on other people’s opinions, or to skepticism, i.e. to the conviction that there is absolutely 
nothing reliable in the sphere of ethics. Instead of the principle of “plausible opinions”, the 
authors of the Port-Royal suggested using the Cartesian principle of “evidence” or “intel-
lectual intuition”. According to this principle, one should “comprise nothing more in my 
judgment than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all 
ground of doubt” [10, p. 23]. The belief that moral judgments should be based on intui-
tively obvious and universal ideas has become a common methodological basis for the 
ethics of the Enlightenment: the Kantian a priori categorical imperative gave the perfect 
wording to this belief.
20th-century philosophy claimed almost unambiguously that the enlighteners’ proj-
ect of the rational substantiation of morality has failed. But Positivist ethics (rising in 
response to ethical universalism and declaring ethical judgments to be simply emotional 
expressions devoid of meaning) relativized morality and completely eliminated any possi-
ble application of reason in this sphere. Moreover, Alasdair MacIntyre in his famous book 
“After Virtue” (1981) demonstrated that in the 20th century such an emotivist approach 
to morality was inherent not only in Positivism but also in Weber’s Rationalism, Exis-
tentialism, Analytical philosophy and other currents of thought alternative to Positivism 
[11]. If there are no efficient methods allowing for the justification of moral norms and 
assessments, then we cannot get rid of Emotivism. Thus, modern ethics must find some 
“middle ground” between the Universalism of the Enlightenment and the Relativism of 
the Modernity1. Giving that, it is not surprising that a kind of revival of casuistic method-
1 It is worth noting that today both moral dogmatism and relativism are unacceptable. The authors of a 
paper on legal ethics note: “In modern society to defend the existence of some absolute morality and eternal 
moral values mean to stand on very questionable ground. At the same time, the comprehensive exposition of 
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ology has happened at the end of the last century, primarily in the sphere of applied ethics 
and ethical expertise.
The most vivid example of such a revival can be found in the book written by Al-
bert R. Johnson, a specialist in bioethics, and Stephen Tulmin, an expert in scientific 
methodology: “The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning” (1988) [13]. It is 
important to emphasize that both authors have worked for some time in the National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Rights. Johnson and Tulmin were surprised 
that while addressing specific problems and circumstances, members of the Commission, 
who had different religious and scientific views, could easily find a compromise: they 
moved from some standard examples of “right” and “wrong” to more and more marginal 
cases. But as soon as they began to use their favored religious beliefs, moral principles, or 
ethical theories in argumentation, compromise became unattainable. These observations 
prompted the authors to investigate the history of moral reasoning. In the book they give 
a detailed overview of the history of casuistry, and bring the reader to the conclusion 
that our everyday practical moral decisions are unconsciously taken in accordance with 
casuistic methods, even though these methods were compromised during the Enlighten-
ment: while making a moral judgment, we rely not only on emotions, but also remember 
known opinions, and assess the consequences of our actions. The authors draw the fol-
lowing conclusion: to resolve moral controversies, we should move not only “downwards” 
(i.e. from moral theories to specific cases), but also “upwards” (i.e. from concrete cases to 
moral theories). To assess the morality or immorality of a particular situation, not only 
ethical principles and doctrines but the situation itself can be used to assess the relevance 
or irrelevance of certain ethical principles and doctrines.
In my opinion, Johnson and Tulmin’s conclusions are correct but need some meth-
odological clarification. Of course, all moral principles, religious commandments, and 
ethical theories should be considered in practice as plausible opinions (opinio probabilis), 
which cannot be a priori applicable to any situation. But the possibility to use them should 
depend on so-called satisfiability. In deontic logic, “satisfiability” and “unsatisfiability” 
have long been used as an analog of truth and falsehood for imperative (normative) sen-
tences. Usually, satisfiability means physical feasibility of a prescribed action. It seems to 
me that in the sphere of ethics, satisfiability should be expanded and obtain the meaning 
of solidity (tuta) in the traditional casuistic sense. A requirement is satisfiable if it does not 
contain any threat to human life, freedom, or dignity, and does not obviously contradict 
other moral requirements. The most important consequence of this approach to ethics 
will be the replacement of the traditional abstraction of universality (general validity) and 
necessity of moral requirements by the abstraction of their potential satisfiability2. The 
moral code includes norms that can potentially be satisfied, but, at the same time, can-
not be a priori applicable to all possible cases. If the abstraction of the universality and 
necessity of moral norms corresponds to the principles of ethical dogmatism (the calling 
to fulfill one’s duty regardless of circumstances), and to deny it means to accept relativ-
ism (permitting the existence of mutually exclusive moral codes), then the abstraction 
of potential satisfiability corresponds to the ideal of “Situational ethics” that presupposes 
“flexibility” of moral norms dependant on circumstances.
the world-view denying the existence of morality in general and its relevance in particular also raises some 
questions — if not theoretical than in the sphere of applied and professional ethics” [12, p. 38].
2 Further on the abstraction of potential satisfiability, see: [14].
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How can we use this in the ethical expertise of cultural phenomena? Of course, 
neither the identification of moral doctrines with probable opinions nor the replace-
ment of the abstraction of universality and necessity of moral requirements with the 
abstraction of their potential satisfiability is enough to make such expertise relevant or 
“objective”. We can term “justified” only those conclusions which are satisfactory to all 
the experts. But there can be no consensus, for example, among those for whom their 
religious feelings are of supreme value, and those who put freedom of conscience above 
all else. Therefore, any ethical expertise should be based not on the beliefs and prin-
ciples of experts, but on an assessment of a specific situation and a comparative analysis 
of the possible consequences occasioned by the application of some moral requirements 
in this specific situation.
5. Conclusion
Thus, casuistry as a method of ethical expertise implies not only an examination 
if a specific case corresponds to general moral principles, but also an examination if 
these general moral principles are applicable to some particular cases. Such expertise 
provides not only a moral assessment of events but also an assessment of morality itself 
(and, contrary to the prevailing opinion, morality is not something unchangeable and 
conservative). Moralities are changeable and can be developed, while ethical expertise 
(and, specifically, expertise of cultural phenomena, which by their very nature are pro-
vocative and unstereotypical) may become an important factor in the development of 
public morals.
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Правдоподобные мнения и безопасные следствия: 
к вопросу о методологии этической экспертизы в сфере культуры
А. И. Бродский
Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет, 
Российская Федерация, 199034, Санкт-Петербург, Университетская наб., 7–9
Для цитирования: Brodsky A. I. Probable opinions and solid outcomes: On the methodology of ethi-
cal expertise in the cultural sphere // Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. Философия и 
конфликтология. 2018. Т. 34. Вып. 3. С. 324–332. https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu17.2018.301
Применение зародившейся в  сфере биомедицинских исследований этической экс-
пертизы к области культуры выявило главную проблему любой экспертизы подобно-
го рода: отсутствие методологии, позволяющей хотя бы частично устранить влияние 
таких «субъективных факторов», как идеологические и  религиозные предпочтения 
экспертов, их личные моральные качества, эмоциональные реакции. Попытка найти 
такую методологию — основная цель данной статьи. Для решения этой задачи автор 
предлагает обратиться к  забытому искусству казуистики, наивысший расцвет кото-
рой приходится на конец XVI — начало XVII в. Главная черта казуистики того време-
ни — рассмотрение различных этических принципов и норм в качестве лишь более 
или менее правдоподобных мнений (opinion probabilis). Решить, какое из этих мнений 
следует выбрать, можно лишь путем их обсуждения и оценки каждого мнения по след-
ствиям, вытекающим из него в каждом конкретном случае. Применение казуистики 
к современной этической экспертизе предполагает, что эксперты должны исходить не 
из своих убеждений и принципов, а из оценки конкретной ситуации и сравнительного 
анализа возможных последствий применения к ней тех или иных моральных требова-
ний. Обоснованным может считаться такой вывод экспертизы, по поводу которого ее 
участникам удалось заключить консенсус. Но такой консенсус будет невозможен, если 
участники экспертизы будут обосновывать свои выводы не анализом последствий тех 
или иных решений, а своими любимыми религиозными или идеологическими доктри-
нами. В теоретическом плане автор статьи считает, что казуистика как метод этической 
экспертизы предполагает не только оценку частного случая с точки зрения его соответ-
ствия общим принципам нравственности, но и оценку самих принципов нравствен-
ности с точки зрения их применимости к частным случаям.
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